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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND TERMINATION FOR 
CONVENIENCE CLAUSES: TIME FOR A MANDATE 
Julie A. Roin* 
For better or worse, and for richer or poorer, the line between government 
and private provision of goods and services is disappearing. It was never a 
bright line; governments have always turned to private purveyors of goods and 
services to acquire many of the tools required for the provision of public 
services.1 The sanitation workers picking up garbage may have been employed 
directly by a city, but they picked up the trash in trucks built by private 
companies. Beneath those trucks are public roads, which have almost always 
been built entirely by private construction companies, not government 
employees.2 Increasingly, however, governments at all levels are contracting 
out responsibility for the services themselves.3 Private enterprises now build 
and staff the garbage trucks.4 They build and operate roadways; they staff 
manual and electronic toll collection systems;5 and they plow and maintain 
road surfaces. Private enterprises also own and run “public” schools6 and 
 
 * Seymour Logan Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful to Saul Levmore 
and to participants at the Emory Law Journal’s 2013 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium for comments on 
earlier versions of this paper, and for the financial support provided by the Samuel J. Kersten Faculty Fund. 
 1 JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE MEANS 4 (1989) (“Large 
fractions of federal, state, and local budgets have always gone to purchase goods and services from suppliers 
outside government.”). 
 2 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-44, HIGHWAY PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS: MORE 
RIGOROUS UP-FRONT ANALYSIS COULD BETTER SECURE POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND PROTECT THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST 3 (2008) [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0844.pdf (“The 
private sector has traditionally been involved as contractors in the design and construction of highways.”). 
 3 These contractual arrangements are often denominated “public-private partnerships” (PPPs). It is 
unclear why they are so denominated, as most of these contractual arrangements do not form “partnerships” in 
which the participants share losses and gains but instead are elaborate contractual relationships “in which the 
private partner provides a public benefit, such as building transportation infrastructure improvements, in return 
for receiving a business opportunity or other benefit from the public agency.” DANIELLE M. CONWAY, STATE 
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT 122 n.66 (2012). They thus entail delegations of authority from 
public authorities to private ones, rather than a joint enterprise between public and private entities.  
 4 See Robert S. Freedman, Comment, The Future of Privatization in Florida, 19 STETSON L. REV. 899, 
900–01 (1990) (mentioning that governments have transferred the “responsibility of control and ownership to 
the private sector . . . in providing sanitation services”). 
 5 Donald G. Featherstun et al., State and Local Privatization: An Evolving Process, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 
643, 645 (2001). 
 6 See Vaughan Brynes, Getting a Feel for the Market: The Use of Privatized School Management in 
Philadelphia, 115 AM. J. EDUC. 437, 439 (2009) (describing the decision to hire Edison Schools to run some of 
Philadelphia’s public schools). 
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prisons.7 On occasion, the government retains its role as financier, collecting 
taxes or fees with which to defray the costs of hiring the private purveyors of 
goods or services.8 Often, however, the government’s role is limited to picking 
the private enterprise which will provide a good or service and negotiating the 
fees that the enterprise can charge for its services; the enterprise then collects 
the appropriate fee directly from residents and other users.9 In theory, the 
incentive provided by the profit motive and the absence of legal restrictions, 
such as civil service protections, allow private entrepreneurs to provide better 
quality services at lower cost than their public counterparts.10 
But what if things go wrong? At times, the public authorities or their 
constituents are dissatisfied with the performance of the private enterprise and 
wish to switch to another private purveyor, to return to public provision, or to 
eliminate the service entirely. Unless the private enterprise’s lack of 
performance rises to the level of a breach of its contractual obligations, a 
government must buy its way out of the contract. And under standard contract 
law, such buyouts do not come cheaply. Private parties insist on receiving 
payments comparable to the compensation due following the government’s 
breach of its obligation to continue the contract. Expectation damages are the 
norm; this measure of damages requires that the nonbreaching party be placed 
in the position that it would have been in had the contract been completed in 
accordance with its terms.11 In the normal course of events, the nonbreaching 
party is entitled to the discounted present value of its projected future profits. 
The extensive term of many of these privatization arrangements not only 
causes the amount of damages to balloon but also ensures that the calculation 
of the amount owed will be contentious and expensive to calculate.12 
 
 7 See E. ANN CARSON & WILLIAM J. SABOL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
BULL. No. NCJ 239808, PRISONERS IN 2011, at 13 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
p11.pdf (“The percentage of all prisoners housed in private prison facilities increased slightly in 2011 from 
7.9% to 8.2%.”). 
 8 Featherstun et al., supra note 5, at 646 n.17. 
 9 See id. at 647. 
 10 See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 1, at 217 (“When it works well, privatization can boost efficiency 
through accelerated innovation, more appropriate technologies or management styles, or a more sensible scale 
of operation.”); Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization, and Public Values, 
15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 113 (2005) (“[T]hose who advocated privatization argued that markets 
and competition could always be relied upon to provide the highest quality services at the lowest cost.”). 
 11 Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract, 1 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 313, 324–25 (1999). 
 12 See id. at 314 n.2. 
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There is an alternative. It is to follow the pattern set by federal procurement 
law and mandate the inclusion of termination for convenience clauses in all 
privatization contracts. Including such clauses would diminish a government’s 
damage obligation in the event it desires to cancel a contract. Instead of paying 
expectation damages, the government would pay something closer to out-of-
pocket reliance damages.13 Specifically, under a termination for convenience 
clause, the government need only pay “the price on work completed, actual 
costs incurred plus a reasonable allowance for profit on partially completed 
work, and nothing whatsoever on work not yet begun (thus, no lost profits on 
such work).”14 
As other commentators have noted, one-sided termination privileges are not 
an unalloyed blessing.15 This Article, however, argues that in the context of 
privatization agreements, the costs of including a termination for convenience 
clause are far outweighed by the benefits. Indeed, in this Article I urge that 
such clauses be both mandatory and nonwaivable. 
Part I describes the history and current use of termination for convenience 
clauses. Part II argues for the use of these clauses in the privatization of 
(previously) government services. Part III concludes. 
I. TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE CLAUSES 
Contractual parties have always had the right to terminate their contracts 
without cause. Ordinarily, such terminations are labeled as “breaches” and 
require the terminating party to pay expectation damages. Termination for 
convenience clauses, by contrast, give the holder of the right the ability to 
terminate the contract without cause while limiting the other party’s recovery 
to “costs incurred, profit on work done, and costs of preparing the termination 
settlement proposal. Recovery of anticipated profit is precluded.”16 They 
confer a “major contract right” on the holder “with no commensurate 
advantage” to the other side—though we should expect prices to reflect the 
agreement and the legal rule.17 
 
 13 Id. at 356. 
 14 Id. at 354. 
 15 See, e.g., id. at 357 (“Thus, in our view, it seems a difficult empirical question whether the benefits of 
the termination for convenience option exceed the costs.”).  
 16 JOHN CIBINIC, JR. & RALPH C. NASH, JR., ADMINISTRATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS 1073 (3d ed. 
1995). 
 17 Id.; see also Fischel & Sykes, supra note 11, at 357 (predicting price increases in the presence of 
termination for convenience clauses). 
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These clauses were initially developed “as a means to end the massive 
procurement efforts that accompanied major wars”18 in the face of “objections 
to paying a contractor profits on unperformed work”19 following the cessation 
of hostilities. Such clauses first appeared at the time of the Civil War, when 
army regulations required that “contracts for subsistence stores ‘shall expressly 
provide for their termination at such time as the Commissary-General may 
direct.’”20 The concept reappeared during World War I when Congress passed 
statutes granting the government authority to settle claims for damages from 
the termination of defense contracts at the end of that war.21 These statutes 
were interpreted as disallowing settlements containing awards of “prospective 
or possible profits.”22 A combination of statutory law23 and regulatory 
provisions24 prevented the award of prospective profits on contracts entered 
into in connection with the World War II war effort. 
Termination for convenience clauses spread to a wider variety of federal 
government contracts after World War II. By 1950, the Armed Services 
Procurement Regulations required all Department of Defense contracts in 
excess of $1,000 to include such clauses.25 The first edition of the Federal 
Procurement Regulations, published in 1964, contained an “optional” 
termination for convenience clause to be used “‘whenever an agency 
considered it necessary or desirable . . . .’”26 In June 1967, those regulations 
were amended to make the use of such clauses mandatory in most federal 
 
 18 CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1073. 
 19 Id. at 1074. 
 20 Id. (quoting Rule 1179 of the Army Regulations of 1863). 
 21 These laws included the Dent Act, Pub. L. No. 65-322, 40 Stat. 1272 (1919), see CIBINIC & NASH, 
supra note 16, at 1074, and the Emergency Shipping Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 65-23, 40 Stat. 182 (1917), see W. 
NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS UNDER THE FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION 1087 n.6 (3d ed. 
2003).  
 22 G.L. Christian & Assocs. v. United States, 312 F.2d 418, 426 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (citing Russell Motor Car 
Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 523–24 (1923)); KEYES, supra note 21, at 1087. 
 23 See Act of Aug. 7, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-657, 60 Stat. 902; Contract Settlement Act of 1944, Pub. L. 
No. 78-395, 58 Stat. 649, 653, § 6(d)(5); G.L. Christian & Assocs., 312 F.2d at 426.  
 24 See G.L. Christian & Assocs., 312 F.2d at 426; 32 C.F.R. § 8006.3(c) (Supp. 1944); CIBINIC & NASH, 
supra note 16, at 1074. 
 25 See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1074. Indeed, in federal contracts entered into after the date on 
which these regulations were promulgated, termination for convenience clauses were inferred as a matter of 
law when express clauses were lacking. See G.L. Christian & Assocs., 312 F.2d at 424 (“As the Armed 
Services Procurement Regulations were issued under statutory authority, those regulations . . . had the force 
and effect of law. . . . [T]here was a legal requirement that the plaintiff’s contract contain the standard 
termination clause and the contract must be read as if it did.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).  
 26 See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1074 (quoting 41 C.F.R. § 1-8.700-2(a) (1964)).  
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(including non-defense) procurement and construction contracts.27 Current 
procurement regulations continue to require the use of a termination for 
convenience clause in virtually all federal procurement contracts.28 
The federal government does not have an unfettered right to terminate a 
contract under a termination for convenience clause. If a termination is made in 
“bad faith” or the contracting agency “abuses its discretion in its decision to 
terminate the contract,”29 the termination is treated as a breach entitling the 
nonbreaching party to a recovery of expectation damages.30 Contractors must 
present clear and convincing evidence of bad faith to prevail,31 however, and 
few plaintiffs have succeeded.32 
Although a finding of bad faith may be predicated on the existence of 
animus, or an “‘intent to injure’ the contractor,”33 animus is not required. Bad 
faith encompasses situations in which the government enters into a contract 
without intending to honor it, regardless of motive.34 In Torncello v. United 
States, for example, the government entered into a requirements contract with 
the plaintiff while “knowing that it [could] obtain an item the contract 
cover[ed] for less than the contract price and intend[ed] to do so.”35 
Essentially, the court found that the government never intended to purchase 
any items under the contract. The Court of Claims held that the government 
could not use the contract’s termination for convenience clause to reduce the 
 
 27 See id. 
 28 See FAR 49.502(b)(1)(i) (2012) (requiring contracting officers to include termination for convenience 
clauses in most federal procurement contracts); id. 52.249-1 to -5 (requiring text of termination for 
convenience clauses to be incorporated into federal procurement contracts). 
 29 See TigerSwan, Inc. v. United States, 110 Fed. Cl. 336, 345 (2013). 
 30 See, e.g., Krygoski Constr. Co. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (refusing to 
award anticipatory profits because there was no indication that the agency abused its discretion or acted in bad 
faith); TigerSwan, Inc., 110 Fed. Cl. at 345 (explaining that common law damages for breach of contract 
would be available to contractor-plaintiffs); Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 772 (Ct. Cl. 1982).  
 31 See T & M Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1279, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
 32 See Krygoski Constr. Co., 94 F.3d at 1541 (stating that “contractors have rarely succeeded in 
demonstrating the Government’s bad faith”); Rice Sys., Inc. v. United States, 62 Fed. Cl. 608, 620–21 (2004) 
(“The court proceeds from a ‘strong presumption that government officials exercise their duties in good 
faith.’” (quoting Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc. v. United States, 281 F.3d 1234, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2002)) 
(citing numerous supporting cases)); CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1078–79 (stating that “[i]t has been 
virtually impossible for terminated contractors to demonstrate Government bad faith” and listing cases). 
 33 See TigerSwan, Inc., 110 Fed. Cl. at 345 (quoting Am-Pro Protective Agency, Inc., 281 F.3d at 1239–
40). 
 34 See Krygoski Constr. Co., 94 F.3d at 1545; TigerSwan, Inc., 110 Fed. Cl. at 346 (“The court disagrees, 
however, with the government’s contention that allegations of intent to harm or animus toward the plaintiff are 
always required to establish a breach of contract claim based on an improper termination for convenience.”). 
 35 681 F.2d at 773 (Friedman, C.J., concurring). 
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damages owed to the plaintiff in that case.36 More recently, the Court of 
Federal Claims refused to grant the government’s motion for judgment on the 
pleadings in TigerSwan, Inc. v. United States37 when the plaintiff alleged that 
contracts terminated by the Department of Defense had been awarded after the 
Department had awarded sole-source contracts for the same work to a 
competitor.38 Again, the basis of the claim was that the government never 
intended to live up to its obligations under the contracts.39 
A plurality of the Torncello court40 wanted to go further, mandating that 
“the termination for convenience clause . . . [be read] to require some kind of 
change from the circumstances of the bargain or in the expectations of the 
parties,”41 so that terminations could not be “based on knowledge of a lower 
cost when that knowledge preceded award of the contract.”42 The plurality also 
intimated that post-contract changes in the price situation might not be enough 
to trigger the termination for convenience clause.43 However, the remaining 
three judges wrote opinions that were considerably narrower in scope, and 
therefore of precedential value.44 Chief Judge Friedman’s brief concurrence 
did not mention the “change in circumstances” test.45 Judge Davis’s 
concurrence criticized the plurality’s opinion as “unnecessarily broad . . . and, 
on some points, incorrect,”46 noting in particular that it was “wrong and a 
mistake to intimate, even provisionally or gratuitously, that the convenience 
termination clause cannot be utilized when a better price appears after the 
contract is made.”47 
 
 36 Id. at 772 (plurality opinion). 
 37 See 110 Fed. Cl. at 346 (“[T]he Circuit has also recognized a potential breach claim where the 
government abused its discretion or never intended for the contract to go forward.”). 
 38 See id. at 347 (“[T]he facts, as alleged in the complaint, demonstrate that the DOD engaged in a 
pattern of conduct to ensure that Aegis completed the contract notwithstanding the awards to TigerSwan. The 
complaint alleges that prior to TigerSwan’s award of contract 6005, the DOD already had a sole-source 
contract to Aegis in the works.”). 
 39 See id. at 343. 
 40 Torncello was decided by six judges sitting en banc. See 681 F.2d at 756, 757. 
 41 Id. at 772. 
 42 Id.  
 43 See id. at 767. 
 44 See id. at 773–74. 
 45 See id. at 773 (Friedman, C.J., concurring). 
 46 Id. (Davis, J., concurring in the result). 
 47 Id. at 774. 
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Subsequent cases seem to have rejected the broader implications of the 
Torncello plurality opinion.48 In Krygoski Construction Company, Inc. v. 
United States, for example, the Federal Circuit allowed the government to 
terminate (and rebid) a contract to demolish some buildings prior to 
performance when a post-contract, but predemolition, survey revealed 
considerably more asbestos contamination than first estimated.49The plaintiff 
contended that the variation in the amount of asbestos was within the scope of 
the original contract, so that there had been no change in circumstances 
justifying a termination for convenience,50 and the trial court agreed.51 The 
Federal Circuit reversed, holding that “Torncello applies only when the 
Government enters a contract with no intention of fulfilling its promises,”52 
and finding “no evidence that the Corps intended from the outset to void its 
promises.”53 
But decisions remain mixed as to whether termination for convenience 
treatment is appropriate in situations caused by “a serious lack of planning, and 
a haphazard process” on the part of the government.54 In Krygoski, where 
termination for convenience was allowed,55 the government could and likely 
should have done a much better job of determining the amount of asbestos that 
needed to be removed prior to bidding out the contract. The same could be said 
of the situation in Special Waste, where the government bid out the removal of 
pounds of waste rather than the twenty-five-times-heavier drums of waste in 
one line item of a much larger bid, and again the error was held to justify 
terminating the contract for convenience.56 In T & M Distributors v. United 
States,57 the Federal Circuit specifically ruled out a requirement that “a 
 
 48 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 11, at 356 (“More recent cases have backed away from Torncello, 
however, suggesting that termination for convenience is permissible in the absence of bad faith (such as an 
intention to injure the contractor in question), as long as the government intended to honor its promises at the 
time they were made.”). 
 49 See 94 F.3d 1537, 1544–45 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 50 Id. at 1539–40.  
 51 See id. at 1545. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id.  
 54 LeRoy J. Haugh, Chapter 18 Terminations, in ACCOUNTING FOR GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS: FEDERAL 
ACQUISITION REGULATIONS § 18.01A(1) (Darrell J. Oyer ed., 2013). 
 55 Krygoski Constr. Co., 94 F.3d at 1545. 
 56 Special Waste, Inc., ASBCA No. 36775, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,935, at 115,129 (“All that is necessary is a 
good faith determination by the contracting officer that its estimate for one of the contract line items was so 
unrealistic that it affected whether the contract had been awarded to the offeror with the lowest overall price.”). 
 57 T & M Distribs., Inc. v. United States, 185 F.3d 1279 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
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cardinal change was a prerequisite for a valid termination for convenience,”58 
approvingly citing an earlier opinion allowing a contracting officer to 
terminate upon his discovery that “a critical contract provision had been poorly 
drafted.”59 Courts have allowed both rebidding of contracts and terminations 
for convenience to remedy bidding defects to further “full and open 
competition,”60 but only if the defects are meaningful.61 The facts of the more 
recently decided Sigal Construction Corp. v. General Services 
Administration,62 though, were quite similar to those in Krygoski and Special 
Waste. In Sigal Construction, the government entered into contracts containing 
unit prices for certain types of work and estimates—which turned out to be 
gross underestimates—of the amount of such work involved in the project.63 
When the true scope of the work became known, the government terminated 
the contracts and sought to rebid the items.64 Yet in that case, the Board of 
Contract Appeals held that termination for convenience treatment was 
inappropriate and that the contracting party could recover anticipated profits.65 
It is also unclear whether contracts can be terminated solely due to post-
contract price changes. Several opinions state that such terminations are 
unacceptable.66 However, contracts can be terminated because of post-contract 
 
 58 Id. at 1284. 
 59 Id.; see also Custom Printing Co. v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 729, 734 (2002) (upholding termination 
for convenience when “Determination of Awards significantly underestimated the actual requirements of the 
Contract . . . and that the integrity of the competitive bidding was adversely affected” when the “figure for 
strip-ins . . . was incorrectly figured at 108, when actually the figure should have been figured at 65,000” 
(quoting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 56, Custom Printing, 51 Fed. Cl. 729 (No. 99-265C)). 
 60 See T & M Distribs., Inc., 185 F.3d at 1284 (quoting Krygoski Constr. Co., 94 F.3d at 1544) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  
 61 See Diversified Sys. Res., Ltd., GSBCA No. 8493-P, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,017, at 106,173. 
 62 CBCA No. 508, 10-1 BCA ¶ 34,442. 
 63 Id. at 169,968–69. 
 64 Id. at 169,969. 
 65 Id. at 169,971. 
 66 See Krygoski Constr. Co. Inc. v. United States, 94 F.3d 1537, 1541 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“A contracting 
officer may not terminate for convenience in bad faith, for example, simply to acquire a better bargain from 
another source.”); NCLN20, Inc. v. United States, 99 Fed. Cl. 734, 759 (2011) (“The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and its predecessor also have held that entering a contract with no intention of 
honoring it, or terminating a contract to find a better bargain, are grounds for invalidating a termination for 
convenience.”). Both of these cases, however, cite the plurality opinion in Torncello for this proposition, and 
as discussed, it is unclear that a majority would hold that terminations for convenience would not be allowed 
for post-contract price changes. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 767 (1982). But see Sigal Constr. 
Corp., CBCA No. 508, 10-1 BCA at 169,971 (holding termination for convenience not available because “the 
Government may not terminate simply to get a better price for performing needed work”—“[t]hat is what GSA 
did here . . . [i]t was a breach of the contract”). It is hard to square the outcome in Sigal Construction with that 
in Special Waste, in which the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals allowed the government to 
terminate a contract for convenience “before performance had begun, because the agency had underestimated 
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changes in policy, including changed conceptions of efficiency. In Northrop 
Grumman Corp. v. United States,67 for example, the Court of Federal Claims 
held that the plaintiff’s contract for work on the Space Station was properly 
terminated “for convenience” when the project was restructured in order to 
save the project by reducing its costs.68 In addition, courts can transform 
improper terminations by default into terminations for convenience.69 
Although damages representing anticipated profits are unavailable 
following a termination for convenience, the government has to recompense its 
contractual partners for completed work as well as the out-of-pocket costs of 
submitting a settlement proposal70 and the costs of entering into the contract.71 
The contracting party is also entitled to compensation for preparations made 
for the terminated parts of the contract, including a reasonable amount for 
profit on those expenditures.72 Damage awards are, however, capped by the 
contract price;73 termination for convenience cannot be used to turn a losing 
contract into a profitable one. Consequential damages are also foreclosed.74 
 
its requirements and the C[ontracting] O[fficer] expected to award at a lower price after recompeting for a 
larger quantity.” Haugh, supra note 54, § 18.01A(1).  
 67 46 Fed. Cl. 622 (2000). 
 68 See id. at 627 (“The Government did not terminate this contract for convenience ‘simply’ to acquire a 
better bargain from another source, even if that may have been the result. . . . NASA wanted to save the Space 
Station. It was in serious jeopardy politically.”). The original configuration involved four prime contractors; 
under the new, more efficient configuration, one of the four, Boeing, became the sole prime contractor. See id. 
at 623; see also CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1081 (citing C.F.S. Air Cargo, Inc., ASBCA No. 36113, 
91-3 BCA ¶ 23,583 as holding that termination for convenience was allowed “where the Government learned 
of better prices 1/2 year after the award”).  
 69 See, e.g., Best Foam Fabricators, Inc. v. United States, 38 Fed. Cl. 627, 637–38 (1997) (explaining that 
when the government lost its claim that no contract existed and that, alternatively, plaintiff’s performance 
under the contract was substandard, the court held that the government’s conduct constituted a constructive 
termination for convenience); John Reiner & Co. v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 443 (Ct. Cl. 1963) (citing 
Coll. Point Boat Corp. v. United States, 267 U.S. 12, 15–16 (1925)). See generally CIBINIC & NASH, supra 
note 16, at 1089 (“The convenience termination clause has been consistently applied to limit the contractor’s 
recovery when the Government wrongfully cancels as a result of an award controversy.”). 
 70 The vehicle for requesting compensation following a termination for convenience is called the 
“termination settlement proposal.” The document is supposed to contain written evidence of the amount of 
money claimed to be due and must be submitted to the appropriate termination contracting officer within one 
year from the effective date of the termination. See Robert D. Witte et al., Termination Settlement Proposals, 
in 2 FEDERAL CONTRACT MANAGEMENT ¶ 12.04 (Henry Goldberg ed., 2013). 
 71 See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1098 (“In fact, it has been stated that the effect of a termination 
for convenience is to convert a fixed-price contract into a cost-reimbursement contract as to the work 
performed up to the effective date of the termination . . . . The contractor’s recovery is thus measured by the 
costs recovered rather than the value of the performance to the Government.”). 
 72 48 C.F.R. § 49.201(a) (2012). 
 73 See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1098 (explaining that there is “overall limitation of the contract 
price”). But see KEYES, supra note 21, at 1090 (“[S]ome courts have been more generous to the contractor and 
ROIN GALLEYSPROOFS 1/21/2014  3:57 PM 
292 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:283 
Although termination for convenience clauses are mandatory in most 
federal procurement contracts, few states impose similar requirements for their 
(and their subordinate governments’) procurement contracts. Instead, their 
codes tend to allow, rather than require, the promulgation of regulations 
authorizing the inclusion of termination of contracts for convenience of the 
state or local government. The statutory language, where it exists at all, follows 
the language contained in the American Bar Association’s Model Procurement 
Code.75 The Model Code’s article 6, Modification and Termination of 
Contracts for Supplies and Services, provides the following: 
(3) Additional Contract Clauses. The [Policy Office] [Chief 
Procurement Officer] may promulgate regulations including, but not 
limited to, regulations permitting or requiring the inclusion in [State] 
contracts of clauses providing for appropriate remedies and covering 
the following subjects: 
. . .  
(d) termination of the contract in whole or in part for the 
convenience of the (State).76 
Interestingly, the ABA’s more recent Model Code for Public Infrastructure 
Procurement77 “[r]eserved”, or failed to propose any language for, the entirety 
of article 6, which, had it been written, would have covered “Modifications and 
Termination of Contracts for Supplies.”78 The difference between a permissive 
and a mandatory approach to inclusion of termination for convenience contract 
clauses is significant. For example, in the infamous Chicago parking meter 
lease agreement, the contract specifically disavowed the city’s right to 
terminate the contract for convenience.79 Given the immense profitability 
 
have measured the benefit conferred on the party in breach by the injured party’s part performance under a 
losing contract and then allowed the injured party restitution of that sum.”). 
 74 See CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1099. 
 75 MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2000). According to the ABA’s 
website, “17 states and many hundreds of local jurisdictions” have adopted the “principles” of this Code. State 
and Local Model Procurement Code, A.B.A., http://apps.americanbar.org/dch/committee.cfm?com=PC500500 
(last modified Nov. 11, 2013). 
 76 MODEL PROCUREMENT CODE FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS § 6-101(3) (bracketed words in 
original).  
 77 MODEL CODE FOR PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE PROCUREMENT (2007). 
 78 See id. at 47. 
 79 See JOURNAL OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE CITY COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 50,637 
(Dec. 4, 2008), available at http://docs.chicityclerk.com/journal/2008/dec4_2008/120408_SP.pdf (providing 
that the city may not terminate “this Agreement for convenience”). 
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projected for the private investors in this transaction, the contractual provision 
all but guarantees that the agreement will run its full seventy-five year term.80 
II. THE NEED TO PRESERVE GOVERNMENTAL FLEXIBILITY 
There are many different types of public-private partnerships. This Article 
focuses on those in which a private entity creates an income-generating public 
asset—usually some item of public infrastructure—and is paid out of the 
income generated by that asset. For example, an investor group may finance 
the rebuilding (or building) of a tollway in return for some number of years’ 
worth of toll revenues. It may build a water or sewer system in return for the 
taxes or fees generated by the system. There are two reasons for special 
concern about these arrangements. First, they have long lives. Second, they 
typically grant the private investors “mini-monopolies,” proscribing the 
development of competing or alternative public (and sometimes private) 
projects in order to protect the investors’ returns. This combination of long-
lived restrictions on public policy gives rise to special concerns. These 
agreements entrench policy choices and thus constrain future governments to 
the point where they are unable to be “democratically responsive to [their] own 
electorate.”81 Mandating the inclusion of termination for convenience clauses 
would offset at least some of that entrenchment. 
A. The Problematic Length of Public-Private Infrastructure Contracts 
Many, if not most, government actions have long-lasting effects, so a long 
time horizon is not necessarily cause for alarm. Thus, for example, the decision 
to adequately fund (or not) public education can have profound, life-long 
effects on the affected schoolchildren. Most publicly constructed infrastructure 
is expected to last for a long time. However, many recent public-private 
infrastructure deals run for terms that are long even by the standards of 
government projects. Many have terms exceeding thirty years, and terms more 
than seventy years are not unknown. The terms of these infrastructure deals 
now found in the United States are often double those found in comparable 
European infrastructure agreements.82 
 
 80 Id. at 50,555. 
 81 See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local Governments, 78 
U. CHI. L. REV. 879, 881 (2011). 
 82 See ALLEN & OVERY, TERMINATION AND FORCE MAJEURE PROVISIONS IN PPP CONTRACTS: REVIEW 
OF CURRENT EUROPEAN PRACTICE AND GUIDANCE 9 (March 2012) (describing typical European PPP terms as 
“between 15 and 30 years”); Jeffrey N. Buxbaum & Iris N. Ortiz, Protecting the Public Interest: The Role of 
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Initially, the longer terms reflected tax considerations.83 Under U.S. income 
tax law, only the “owners” of depreciable property are entitled to claim 
depreciation deductions with respect to such property. As these depreciation 
deductions are accelerated,84 generating time value of money gains, obtaining 
the right to claim these deductions often constitutes an important economic 
element in the overall deal.85 In the absence of fee simple ownership,86 tax law 
requires an “owner” to have an investment interest in property that extends 
beyond the design life of the asset at the time of the transaction.87 The terms of 
many public-private infrastructure deals have been set with those rules in 
mind.88 In some cases, however, the only explanation for an expansive lease 
term seems to lie in the government’s desire for a larger up-front payment.89 
The justification for lengthy contractual terms is immaterial to the problem 
they create. That problem is that as long as the contract remains in force, the 
public infrastructure asset has to be operated in accordance with whatever 
operational standards were set forth in the initial contract. Even if—and it is a 
big if—the standards set in these contracts were perfectly appropriate at the 
 
Long-Term Concession Agreements for Providing Transportation Infrastructure 10 (USC Keston Inst. for Pub. 
Fin. & Infrastructure Policy, Research Paper No. 07-02, 2007) (citing the ninety-nine-year lease for the 
Chicago Skyway and the seventy-five-year lease for the Indiana Toll Road). 
 83 See GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 26–27 (describing how ninety-nine- and seventy-five-year lease 
terms of tollway agreements enable investors to claim accelerated depreciation deductions for tax purposes). 
 84 That is, these deductions may be claimed on a schedule faster than economic depreciation, resulting in 
the understatement of investors’ taxable income relative to their economic income in the early years of the 
asset’s use. In later years, investors’ depreciation deductions would fall below economic depreciation; as a 
result in those years taxable income would exceed economic income. However, assuming a positive rate of 
interest, the tax savings generated by the earlier years’ taxable income understatements would more than make 
up for the tax detriment of later years’ overstatements. See id. at 27 n.19. 
 85 See id. at 21–26 (“[T]he availability of these [depreciation] deductions were important incentives to 
the private sector to enter some of the highway public-private partnerships we reviewed.”). 
 86 Governments often would not or could not (because of “public trust” issues) give up fee simple 
ownership of the underlying property to private investors, even had the investors wanted such ownership. For 
example, the City of Chicago would not be willing to permanently alienate the portions of its streets used for 
on-street parking.  
 87 See Rev. Rul. 55-541, 1955-2 C.B. 19 (holding that a lease transfers “equitable ownership” when a 
lessee “will enjoy all of the benefits of ownership for substantially the entire useful life of the property”). 
 88 See Celeste Pagano, Proceed with Caution: Avoiding Hazards in Toll Road Privatizations, 83 ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 351, 374 (2009) (“The long terms of the agreements arise in part from the economic benefit 
that the toll road company gets by claiming accelerated depreciation for tax purposes.”). 
 89 See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., CITY OF CHI., REPORT OF INSPECTOR GENERAL’S FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE LEASE OF THE CITY’S PARKING METERS 19 (2009), available at 
http://chicagoinspectorgeneral.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Parking-Meter-Report.pdf [hereinafter INSPECTOR 
GENERAL’S REPORT] (“[T]he useful life of the parking meters is not likely to exceed 10 years. Thus, extending 
the length of the lease to 75 years was not necessary to allow the concessionaire to claim accelerated 
depreciation and thus increase the size of the upfront payment.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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time they were entered into, they are very unlikely to be appropriate twenty, 
forty, or sixty years in the future. For example, the types of vehicles that will 
be on the road thirty years from now may be quite different from those that 
currently exist, making changes in road design or construction that are at odds 
with the standards set in a tollway contract highly desirable. Alternatively, 
climate change or changes in development patterns may suggest changes in 
road construction or location, which could have the effect of making a 
particular tollway unexpectedly valuable—or worthless.90 Impurities in water 
once thought to be harmful may be proved the opposite, and those thought safe 
(or simply unknown at the time a water or wastewater facility was contracted 
for) may be proven dangerous. Empirical studies may show that certain 
rehabilitation programs called for in a contract for the operation of a prison are 
counterproductive, while other types of programs have positive impacts. 
Similarly, theories of incarceration may change; a jurisdiction may decide that 
it should substitute house arrest or monitored release for incarceration, but may 
find itself bound to provide a certain number of prisoners to a private jail 
facility by contract. Government officials may decide that parking meters 
should be eliminated in favor of phone- or wireless-based metering, or that 
parking should be made less accessible to encourage people to use public 
transportation. Investors (or governments) may learn how to subvert the intent 
of standards set forth in a contract while formally adhering to them, leading to 
public policy disasters. 
Even in Europe, where terms of public-private infrastructure agreements 
tend to be about half the length of those entered into in the United States,91 it is 
widely acknowledged that such contracts are necessarily “incomplete” because 
“[t]hey cannot cover the entire range of possible events that might arise during 
their lifetime.”92 Over the term of the contract, then, renegotiation or 
termination may be likely, desirable, or both. Unfortunately, application of the 
general rule for calculating contract damages—expectation damages—makes it 
both extremely difficult and costly to amend or terminate even the most 
 
 90 See, e.g., Justin Gillis & Felicity Barringer, As Coasts Rebuild and U.S. Pays, Repeatedly, the Critics 
Ask Why, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2012, at A1 (questioning whether it “actually makes sense to keep rebuilding 
in disaster-prone areas”); Mireya Navarro, New York Is Lagging as Seas and Risks Rise, Critics Warn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 11, 2012, at A1 (describing possible impacts of climate change on “teeming roads and fragile 
infrastructure”).  
 91 See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 82, at 9 (describing the typical European public-private infrastructure 
deal term as “between 15 and 30 years”); Buxbaum & Ortiz, supra note 82, at 10.  
 92 See ALLEN & OVERY, supra note 82, at 9.  
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anachronistic of these “incomplete” agreements. In the absence of a low-cost 
termination threat, the costs of renegotiation escalate. 
B. Expectation Damages Unduly Limit Desirable Contract Terminations 
The use of expectation damages is generally defended as necessary to 
prevent the inefficient termination of contracts.93 However, this argument 
hinges on two predicates, neither of which is likely true in the context of 
public-private infrastructure contracts. The first is that expectation damages 
can be accurately calculated at a reasonable cost. The second is that politicians 
will accurately weigh the costs and benefits of terminating these contracts. 
The term of many public-private infrastructure contracts makes calculating 
expectation damages both uncertain and expensive. Expectation damages 
include profits projected to the end of the contractual term—an amount that 
more or less corresponds to the present value of the stream of revenues the 
counterparty would have received under the contract had it continued in force 
less the costs saved by the counterparty through the cessation of performance 
following its notification of the contract’s termination.94 The more long-lived 
the contractual arrangement, the more difficult and uncertain this calculation 
becomes.95 Parties can argue over the appropriate interest rate to be used when 
discounting a projected stream of revenue to present value, they can dispute 
those estimates of future revenue, and they can quarrel over estimates of future 
costs. The longer the contractual term and the more distant in time the events 
being predicted, the less reliable the estimates of costs, revenues, and 
appropriate discount rates become—and the more likely the parties will proffer 
hugely different estimates of value.96 Even if the agreement spells out a 
 
 93 See Gillian Hadfield, Of Sovereignty and Contract: Damages for Breach of Contract by Government, 8 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 467, 511 (1999) (“The argument places expectation damages in the role of the invisible 
hand, guiding private decisions to coincide with socially optimal decisions, namely efficient allocation of 
resources to their highest valued use.”). 
 94 There are many ways of calculating expectation damages. At a conceptual level, the damages should 
equal the present value of the stream of revenues the counterparty would have received under the contract less 
the costs the counterparty avoids by ceasing performance following notification of the contract’s termination. 
See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 95 GAO REPORT, supra note 2, at 54 (describing difficulties encountered in “modeling long-term events 
and reliably estimating costs” for purposes of determining life-cycle costs of PPP projects). Indeed, some 
courts refuse to grant expectation damages for contracts with excessive duration because such damages cannot 
be determined with sufficient certainty. See E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, 3 FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 273 (3d 
ed. 2004) (“[A] significant factor [in disallowing the use of expectancy damages because of  
uncertainty] . . . . is the length of time over which performance is to extend.”).  
 96 If calculating expectation damages is too difficult, of course, even standard contract theory would call 
for the award of damages calculated under the reliance measure of damages. This measure of damages could 
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procedure or authority for making these tough decisions, the underlying 
difficulty—the rather nebulous correspondence between past events and 
predictions of future revenue and costs—inevitably will leave the process 
subject to charges of misbehavior. A government operating in good faith may 
be unwilling to run the political risks of being tarred with such accusations and 
may, therefore, let an agreement run its course, despite its social costs. 
Moreover, even in the absence of a dispute over the amount of damages, 
the sheer size of an expectation-based award may prevent the government from 
cancelling an obsolete contract. The temporal split between the year in which 
these damages would be announced or paid and the years in which the benefits 
of the cancellation would be reaped could discourage many politicians from 
cancelling contracts.97 This discouragement would exist whether or not the 
cancellations would be “efficient” from a social welfare perspective. Damages 
have to be paid—and the budgetary impacts dealt with—during the political 
lifetime of the politicians voting to terminate the contract, while many benefits 
of termination would accrue to future voters and politicians. The longer the 
remaining term of the contract, the less likely it is that those future voters and 
politicians would be the same individuals as the current voters and politicians, 
and the less likely it is that those future individuals’ interests will be 
adequately taken into account by current politicians trying to decide whether to 
terminate a contract.98 From a political standpoint, it may be easier for 
politicians to blame policy failures on the handcuffs placed by previous 
administrations than to incur the costs necessary to unlock the restraints. 
 
lead to an award that is even lower than that provided for under a termination for convenience clause. 
However, no private investor would willingly accept such a lesser award; the possibility that a court might 
impose this damage measure as a result of litigation is sufficiently remote that it would be unlikely to have 
much effect on private investors’ negotiating position in the event of an attempt to terminate or reform these 
contracts. See generally MARVIN A. CHIRELSTEIN, CONCEPTS AND CASE ANALYSIS IN THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
189–216 (6th ed. 2010). 
 97 This is the converse of the problem that may lead to the unwarranted popularity of these deals. See 
Julie A. Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1965, 1993 (2011) (noting that 
“governments’ need for immediate cash” can encourage “unwise privatization[s] . . . which provide little or no 
efficiency advantages while burdening future generations of taxpayers with higher out-of-pocket costs for the 
privatized service, or higher government taxes or fees or some combination of the two”); see also Fischel & 
Sykes, supra note 11, at 336 (“There is no reason to think that expectation damages against the government 
will in general promote efficient performance and breach decisions, for example, or that a specific 
performance remedy will tend to induce efficient renegotiation about performance.”). 
 98 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 11, at 333 (“By contrast, there is less reason to suppose that 
government agents will place proper value on the long-term consequences of their policies. . . . [G]overnment 
agents have a finite time horizon, and the pursuit of their own utility may not by itself lead them to give much 
weight to future events after their departure from government.”). 
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The inclusion of a termination for convenience clause will not eliminate 
these problems. Difficult questions may arise regarding the amount owed 
under a termination clause.99 Further, the amount of damages due following a 
termination for convenience may be far from nominal. Particularly where the 
private investors made significant up-front investments in facilities or large 
cash payments, the payments called for under a termination for convenience 
clause could be substantial.100 They may be substantial enough to prevent 
politicians from engaging in some socially efficient terminations—even taking 
into account the chilling effect on future contract negotiations. However, 
eliminating unearned profits from the damages calculation should reduce the 
total amount due, thus making it at least somewhat more likely that inefficient 
or obsolete contracts will be terminated. 
Moreover, the inclusion of a termination for convenience clause may cause 
public infrastructure contracts to be drafted in ways that would make the 
calculation of damages easier. Depreciation or amortization schedules for 
private investors’ contributions may be spelled out, making it easier (and less 
controversial) to calculate damages due if a termination for convenience is 
contemplated.101 
Even if the costs of terminating for convenience continue to deter 
governments from terminating most obsolete public infrastructure contracts, 
the availability of a termination option may affect the terms on which contracts 
may be renegotiated to deal with changed circumstances. The threat of 
termination can counterbalance private investors’ incentive to behave 
opportunistically during a renegotiation. 
 
 99 See, e.g., CIBINIC & NASH, supra note 16, at 1109 (“The consideration of initial and preparatory costs 
in termination settlements has caused considerable confusion.”). 
 100 Those payments also, of course, will make it more likely that private parties would enter into these 
contracts at all. Without a guarantee that their costs will be covered in the event of a change in government 
policy, investors would be unwilling participate in contracts that require them to incur large up-front expenses, 
as called for under many public infrastructure contracts. See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 11, at 323 (“[I]n the 
absence of contract rights and remedies, parties to nonsimultaneous exchange may decline to undertake jointly 
valuable reliance.”).  
 101 It is not beyond the realm of possibility that some investors will try to insert “poison pills,” in the form 
of extremely back-loaded depreciation/amortization schedules for their contributions, in an effort to nullify the 
termination for convenience option. Presumably, such specifications (if accepted by the government 
counterparty to begin with) could be treated as a penalty (excessive liquidated damages) by a court. Relying on 
a court for salvation from a bad deal would, however, be quite messy and uncertain. See id. at 354–57 
(discussing the termination for convenience option). 
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C. The Termination for Convenience Option Provides Needed Leverage in 
Negotiations 
In 1987, Robert Scott developed a model for analyzing “the 
decisionmaking strategies of parties to long-term commercial contracts,” and, 
in particular, for how they decide “whether to adjust cooperatively . . . or to 
respond to immediate self-interest and evade . . . responsibility.”102 His aim 
was to determine the conditions necessary to “promote stable patterns of 
cooperation” rather than “a counterpattern of exploitation and conflict.”103 One 
key to ensuring a stable cooperative equilibrium, he argued, was the 
availability of “contractual sanctions.”104 Essentially, the game is one of “tit for 
tat” with good behavior by one party rewarded with good behavior by the 
other, and vice versa. Both sides must have credible threats to use in the event 
of bad behavior by the other party. 
It is hard to identify the government’s threat in many public-private 
infrastructure contracts that suffer from drastically changed conditions. As a 
result, a private “partner” may be tempted to try to extract a premium for its 
cooperation when asked to renegotiate.105 Nothing would prevent a 
strategically minded private prison operator, for example, from refusing to 
substitute classes or activities (now) known to reduce recidivism for those that 
were specified in the original contract—even if the better classes were of equal 
cost. In such cases, the inclusion of a termination for convenience clause 
would provide the government bargaining leverage. A private investor will be 
more likely to cooperate in the social interest if it knows that its governmental 
counterpart can terminate the contract and prevent it from earning any further 
profits. 
Strategic behavior by investors is not just a theoretical possibility. When 
the City of Chicago wanted to provide its citizens with the option of paying 
parking fees through their cell phones—an option touted as cost reducing106—
the consortium holding the parking meter lease refused to allow this revision to 
its agreement until the city agreed to allow it to charge users a 35¢-per-
transaction convenience fee and maintain a $20 interest-free, prepayment 
 
 102 See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperation in Long-Term Contracts, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 2005, 2008 
(1987). 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. at 2039. 
 105 See id. at 2021. 
 106 See Pay-by-Phone Parking, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pay-by-phone_parking (last 
visited Dec. 11, 2013) (explaining that “pay-by-phone parking offers an opportunity for reduced costs”). 
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balance with the company,107 a combination that is at the high end of charges 
for this service. The parking meter investors seem to have used these 
renegotiations as an opportunity to increase their profits while likely 
decreasing their costs of performance. The city might have been able to strike a 
better balance if the investors’ rights to continued profits under the original 
agreement were at risk in the negotiations. In the absence of a termination for 
convenience term, however, Chicago had no leverage. If it wanted parkers to 
enjoy the benefits of pay-by-phone, it had to pay the investors off, even though 
the option is likely to simultaneously reduce investors’ overall costs and 
increase their revenues.108 
III.  THE DOWNSIDE OF TERMINATION FOR CONVENIENCE CLAUSES: A CLOUD 
WITH A SILVER LINING? 
A termination for convenience clause is not something that can be slipped 
into a contract. Because it confers a substantial benefit on the contracting 
government, the other contracting party will undoubtedly extract some price 
for its inclusion. Indeed, at least one pair of academic commentators has 
concluded that “it seems a difficult empirical question whether the benefits of 
the termination for convenience option exceed the costs.”109 There is, after all, 
 
 107 See Bill Ruthhart & Hal Dardick, Private Parking Firm Would Make More Money on Pay-by-Cell 
Plan, CHI. TRIB. NEWS (May 9, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-05-09/news/ct-met-city-
council-parking-meters-20130509_1_parking-firm-meter-hours-chicago-parking-meters-llc (discussing how 
the company expected to make $2 million per year from convenience fees, making no estimate of profit 
derived from investing money placed by drivers into prepaid accounts). The charges are relatively high. The 
contractual modification involved much more than the addition of the cell-phone payment option, however. 
The agreement includes alterations in parking meter hours and rates and a settlement of disputed charges for 
out-of-service meters and the overuse of handicapped parking permits. See Hal Dardick, Revised Deal Still a 
Gain for Parking Meter Vendor, Analysis Finds, CHI. TRIB. NEWS (May 24, 2013), http://articles. 
chicagotribune.com/2013-05-24/news/ct-met-emanuel-parking-meters-deal-0524-20130524_1_remaining-71-
years-chicago-parking-meters-llc-metered-spaces/2. Absent a detailed accounting of the projected costs and 
savings from each part of the contract, which both parties refused to provide, it is impossible to know whether 
the arrangement concerning cell-phone charges stood on its own or was intended to subsidize some other part 
of the agreement. Thus, it may be unfair to cast aspersions on the investors. Or it may be totally accurate. 
 108 As more parkers opt to use cell phones rather than physical meters, it would not be surprising to see 
some reduction in the number of physical meters over time (as well as a decrease in the costs of servicing 
existing meters). In addition, parkers paying by cell phone receive messages alerting them to expiring meters 
and encouraging them to add additional time to the meter (again by cell phone). Under the terms of the 
Chicago Parking Meter lease, the private investors receive all parking meter revenues, while the city benefits 
from fines levied on overstaying parkers. See INSPECTOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 89, at 3.  
 109  Fischel & Sykes, supra note 11, at 357. Ultimately, they conclude that if a termination for 
convenience clause is a desirable feature of government contracting, it is because “it makes it harder for 
officials in power at the moment to enter durable deals for the inefficient transfer of rents to favored interest 
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no particular reason to think that private investors will undercharge for this 
restriction on their contract rights. As a result, governments (and their tax- and 
fee-paying publics) that are parties to contractual relationships will end up 
paying more for their projects than if these clauses were not required. 
But a problem with at least some public-private infrastructure deals is that 
they offer public officials a mechanism for obtaining up-front cash without 
fully disclosing the long-term price (in the form of higher user fees or taxes) 
that will have to be paid later on.110 It is possible (if not probable) that the costs 
of a termination for convenience clause will be absorbed by a reduction in the 
amount of these up-front payments. Providing for a longer contract term or 
higher payment rates—both of which may disappear should the termination 
clause be invoked—would seem to be inferior payment options from the 
standpoint of the investors in such deals. Diminishing initial cash transfers 
should make these deals less attractive to politicians. If surreptitious debt 
capable of financing current noncapital expenditures is the great attraction for 
politicians, then we should welcome means of reducing these transactions. 
Transparency is both attractive from a democratic perspective and cheaper.111 
There is, in the end, a trade-off. Exceptionally well crafted agreements 
might be long-term, without termination clauses, and yet in the interest of 
taxpayers. It is more likely, however, that citizens and taxpayers would benefit 
from further constraints on politicians inclined to strike very long-term deals. 
The impossibility of seeing seventy-five years ahead is sufficient reason to 




groups” because when “political power changes hands, new officials can terminate the contract at lower cost 
than if ordinary contract damages were payable.” See id. at 356–57. 
 110 See Roin, supra note 97, at 2012–18 (explaining how the public generally misunderstands these 
transactions). 
 111 See id. at 2010. 
